Published 13 November 2026 — the full thesis, unchanged.
Hims & Hers closed Friday at $19.73, down 24.1% on the week. The damage came in two sessions. On Monday, 9 November, the stock fell 11.8% before the company had reported anything. That evening it printed a third quarter in which revenue grew 49% to $890.4 million, subscribers fell by about 100,000 to 2.79 million, gross margin dropped to 57% from 74%, and full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance was cut for the third time this year, to $257 to $277 million. Tuesday took another 16.6% off. Fourth-quarter revenue guidance of $875 to $895 million is flat with the third quarter at best, after sequential gains of $145 million and $137 million in the two quarters before it, and on the same Tuesday five more states joined the Federal Trade Commission's lawsuit over the company's subscription billing and health-data sharing.
That leaves HIMS 19% below its 200-week moving average of $24.35, a line it crossed this week on 2.7 times its normal volume. The stock has been under that line before, and the record splits in two. In June 2021 it went under, stayed there 86 weeks, fell as far as 65% below the line, and was down 61% a year later. In May 2023 it went under for 34 weeks and was up 116% a year later. It dipped again for four weeks this February, bottomed at $14.52 on 27 February, climbed back over the line in March after Novo Nordisk dropped its lawsuit, and slipped under again for three weeks into April. (The site's price history for HIMS starts in August 2020, so the line before mid-2024 is built on less than four years of prices. I treat the early readings as rough.) The site's average return after a touch for this stock is 6.7%, which is another way of saying the line has been a coin flip here. The line tells me the stock is cheap against its own history. Which of the two outcomes this visit becomes is what the rest of this piece is for.
I went through the 2025 10-K, the third-quarter 10-Q and earnings call, the Eucalyptus purchase accounting, the terms of both convertible notes, the FTC complaint as amended on Tuesday, and the Lilly and Novo agreements. Three things the headlines skipped decide the call. First, most of the 49% revenue growth is the price of someone else's drug passing through the till: gross profit per subscriber is about $60 a month, the same as a year ago, and has not been higher in six quarters. Second, the company owes the sellers of Eucalyptus and its other acquisitions about $563 million over the next year, payable at its option in stock, which at this price would be 12% of the share count. Third, stock compensation now runs at $64.5 million a quarter, which consumes most of what adjusted EBITDA reports.
My call is that HIMS is a value trap at $19.73: a real platform with 2.8 million paying members, priced roughly where management's own 2030 plan would put it, in the quarter that plan lost credibility. The risk posture is simple. This is a stock with 26% of its float sold short and a measured beta of 2.5, and it can rise 30% in a week for reasons unrelated to anything below.
Andrew Dudum launched Hims in 2017 out of Atomic, the San Francisco startup studio where he was a general partner. The first products were generic sildenafil for erectile dysfunction and finasteride for hair loss, prescribed after an online consultation and shipped in packaging a man would leave on the counter. Both conditions share four properties: the drug is cheap and generic, the need recurs every month, the patient would rather skip the waiting room, and nobody's insurance is involved. That is the original model in one line. A recurring cash-pay prescription with a brand on it.
The first reinvention was Hers, launched in late 2018 with birth control and later extended into dermatology, hair, mental health and menopause. Hers doubled the addressable population without doubling the infrastructure, because the provider network, pharmacy and checkout were already built. On the third-quarter call management said the Hers brand is approaching $1 billion of revenue this year.
In January 2021 Hims listed through a merger with Oaktree Acquisition Corp, a SPAC, at a valuation of about $1.6 billion, with roughly $280 million of proceeds. The timing caught the top of the telehealth trade, and by May 2022 the shares had fallen to $3.11. What the company did in that trough is the first piece of capital allocation worth grading, and it grades well. It bought a UK telehealth business (now Hims & Hers UK) and Apostrophe, a dermatology pharmacy, in mid-2021, with restricted stock as part of the consideration. Then it spent two years building its own fulfillment. By the end of 2025 it ran two licensed 503A pharmacies, two UK pharmacies, a 503B outsourcing facility, a laboratory and a peptide manufacturing plant. Revenue went from $526.9 million in 2022 to $872.0 million in 2023 to $1.48 billion in 2024, and GAAP net income swung from a $65.7 million loss in 2022 to a $126.0 million profit in 2024. The pharmacy build is the reason that swing happened. Owning the dispensing step is what let a cheap generic subscription earn a gross margin above 80% in 2023.
The second reinvention made the stock famous. In May 2024 Hims began offering compounded injectable semaglutide while the branded drug sat on the FDA shortage list. Revenue rose 59% in 2025 to $2.35 billion, monthly revenue per subscriber went from $65 to $83, and the shares closed at $68.74 on 19 February 2025, twenty-two times the 2022 low. Compounding exploited a legal window, and the window had a shelf life. The shortage ended, and from there Hims ran a two-year fight with Novo Nordisk. A first Novo collaboration was announced at the end of April 2025 and ended by Novo in June 2025 over how Hims was marketing compounded copies. That episode is now the subject of a consolidated securities class action whose class period starts on 29 April 2025.
Then came the episode that tells me the most about how this company makes decisions. On Thursday 5 February 2026 Hims announced a compounded semaglutide pill at $49 for the first month, a direct shot at Novo's newly launched Wegovy pill at $149. On the Friday the FDA said it would move to restrict GLP-1 ingredients used in mass-marketed compounded drugs, and Novo said it would sue. On the Saturday Hims dropped the product. Novo filed its patent suit in Delaware on Monday 9 February anyway, and the stock fell through its 200-week line that week, eventually trading 28% below it. A product that lived for two days cost the company its negotiating position.
The third reinvention was the repair, and it came quickly. On 9 March Novo agreed to dismiss its suit while reserving the right to refile, and to sell Wegovy and Ozempic, in pill and injectable form, through the platform. Hims agreed to stop advertising compounded GLP-1s. The stock rose more than 36% that morning. The 10-Q describes what followed as a "strategic shift": the US weight-loss offering moved to branded drugs, with compounded product kept "on a limited scale," plus a paid membership program. On 6 November, three days before this week's print, Lilly signed too.
The fourth reinvention is international, and it was bought. The table lists every acquisition since the start of 2025, at the accounting price the filings give.
| Deal | Closed | What it added | Price (accounting) |
|---|---|---|---|
| C S Bio assets | Feb 2025 | Peptide manufacturing plant | $41.2M |
| Trybe Labs | Feb 2025 | US lab testing | $5.1M |
| Zava | Jul 2025 | UK, Germany, Ireland, France, Spain | €219.2M ($258.0M) |
| Medici | Nov 2025 | Canada | C$39.1M ($27.8M) |
| YourBio Health | Jan 2026 | Capillary blood sampling | $153.0M |
| Eucalyptus | Jun 2026 | Australia, Japan, plus UK, Germany, Canada; Juniper and Pilot brands | $968.5M (up to $1.15B) |
The financing tells the rest. At the end of 2024 Hims carried $11.3 million of lease obligations and no borrowings. In May 2025 it issued $1.0 billion of 0% convertible notes due 2030, convertible at $70.67. In May 2026 it issued $402.5 million more, due 2032, convertible at $29.53. Twenty-one months took the company from no debt to $1.4 billion of convertible notes and another $563 million owed to the sellers of the businesses it bought. My grade on the whole record: the pharmacy build was excellent, compounding built the revenue base, the February pill was a self-inflicted wound, and the acquisition spree is the part still being graded, in this week's numbers.
Andrew Dudum (co-founder, chairman and CEO) has run the company since before its launch; the company page dates his tenure as CEO and director to September 2016. He is 37 and previously co-founded Atomic, where he was a general partner and helped build Bungalow, Homebound, TalkIQ and Terminal. He is the strategist and the public voice, on X and on every call, and his instinct is to move first and settle the argument later. His summary of the thesis this quarter was "In health care, whoever owns the customer relationship wins." His answer on the lost subscribers was that the trade-off is one "we will make every time." Founder conviction is an asset in a company that has reinvented itself four times. It is also how the February pill happened.
Yemi Okupe (CFO since January 2022, after six months as CFO of Hipcamp) ran finance for Uber Eats and then Uber's global mobility unit from 2019 to 2021, after finance roles at eBay, PayPal's Braintree and Google Payments. He is the person on the calls who explains the margin, and his line this quarter was that the company chose to trade near-term subscriber growth for a stronger long-term position, followed by a warning of "an additional quarter of subscriber count headwinds." He sold 29,277 shares at $29.95 in September after exercising options at $5.01. His record as the person who sets the numbers is the weak spot: the 2026 adjusted EBITDA guide went from $300 to $375 million in February, to $275 to $350 million in May, to $275 to $325 million in August, to $257 to $277 million this week, with Eucalyptus added along the way.
Mike Chi (COO) joined in April 2021 from Zola, where he was CMO, after marketing roles at Gilt and INTERMIX. A marketer in the operating chair says a lot about where this company's core competence sits: customer acquisition is the craft, and the rest is built to serve it.
Mo Elshenawy (CTO) arrived in May 2025 from Cruise, where he was president and CTO, after senior engineering roles at Amazon. Under him the company says it ran its largest engineering hiring quarter ever, and its AI care experience now reaches about 70% of weight-loss subscribers, with nearly all of them expected by year-end.
Deb Autor (Chief Policy Officer since November 2025, director since November 2024) spent 2001 to 2013 at the FDA, finishing as Deputy Commissioner for Global Regulatory Operations and Policy, then worked at Mylan and ran regulatory excellence at AstraZeneca. Dr. Pat Carroll (Global CMO, first from 2019 to January 2022 and again since December 2022) was Walgreens' chief medical officer from 2014 to 2019. Soleil Boughton (Chief Legal Officer since 2018) was a healthcare partner at Jones Day. Kathy Beiser (Chief Communications Officer since February 2026) previously ran communications at Eli Lilly, among others. Read the hiring pattern as a map of where the company thinks its risk lives: a former FDA deputy commissioner, a former Lilly communications chief and a healthcare litigator.
Two details on alignment. The CEO's newest performance options are underwater: 557,244 at $34.71 that vest on 2027 revenue and adjusted EBITDA targets, and 665,456 at $25.88 tied to 2028. And the only open-market insider purchase in the past year was director David Wells buying 48,400 shares for $1.17 million on 26 May, at about $24. Officers sold from August to October at $27 to $35.
Hims reports a single segment. It discloses revenue by geography, online versus wholesale, subscribers, and monthly revenue per average subscriber. It does not disclose revenue by condition, so where I describe a specialty's size I quote management or mark my own estimate. The membership base first:
| Period | Subscribers (end) | Monthly revenue / avg. subscriber | Gross margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | 1.54M | $56 | 82% |
| FY2024 | 2.23M | $65 | 79% |
| FY2025 | 2.51M | $83 | 74% |
| Q1 2026 | 2.58M | $80 | 65% |
| Q2 2026 | 2.89M | $92 | 64% |
| Q3 2026 | 2.79M | $105 | 57% |
The Q3 2026 subscriber count includes Eucalyptus, which closed in June, so the 13% year-over-year growth is partly bought. The sequential decline of about 103,000 is the first in the company's history as a public company.
1. US online: the core subscription business
This is everything a US customer buys through hims.com and forhers.com: sexual health, hair, dermatology, mental health, testosterone, menopause and weight loss. In 2025 the company said its personalized offerings were over 70% of US revenue, up from about half in 2024. That mix shift is what drove gross margin and revenue per subscriber up through 2024.
| Period | US revenue | YoY growth |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $854.5M | n/a |
| FY2024 | $1,449.7M | +70% |
| FY2025 | $2,213.6M | +53% |
| 9M 2026 | $1,808.8M | +9% |
| Q3 2026 | $657.1M | +21% |
The US went from +53% to +9% for the first nine months of 2026. Q1 2026, the quarter of the February pill and the March pivot, grew total revenue just 4%. Q3's 21% looks like a recovery, and the CFO said Q3 revenue excluded $18 million of weight-loss membership revenue that will be recognized in Q4. The catch is what the growth is made of, which I take up in the first of the three angle sections below.
2. Weight loss: from compounder to storefront
Weight loss is the specialty that built the 2025 revenue base and the one that broke 2026 guidance. Hims has never disclosed its revenue. What changed this year is the product: in place of a compounded semaglutide it made itself, the US customer now mostly gets a branded drug made by Novo or Lilly at the manufacturer's self-pay price, and Hims charges for its membership separately from the medication. The price map:
| Product | Maker | Price through Hims | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compounded semaglutide pill | Hims | $49 first month | Announced 5 Feb, pulled 7 Feb 2026 |
| Wegovy pill and pen, Ozempic | Novo | Novo cash prices, $149–$299/mo | Live since late Mar 2026 |
| Foundayo | Lilly | From $149/mo | Signed 6 Nov 2026 |
| Zepbound | Lilly | From $299/mo | Signed 6 Nov 2026 |
| Compounded GLP-1s | Hims | Not advertised | "Limited scale"; none of Lilly's molecules, ever |
The Lilly prices match LillyDirect. Hims gets no discount. What Hims gets is the right to sell the drug the patient already wants without leaving its own app, and Lilly gets a distribution channel it clearly values: by Lilly's count, one in three new patients starting a branded weight-loss drug in 2025 got Zepbound self-pay vials. Lilly also extracted a commitment that Hims will never offer compounded copies of Lilly's GLP-1s. For the patient this is cleaner. For Hims it converts a product it manufactured at high margin into one it resells at a retail margin, with the membership fee as the profit line. That is the single biggest reason gross margin fell from 74% to 57%.
3. International: bought, then rebranded
International was a rounding error until 2025. Zava, Medici and Eucalyptus changed that. Eucalyptus alone contributed about $135 million in Q3, and the rest of the international book grew nearly 80%.
| Period | Rest of World revenue | YoY growth |
|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $17.5M | n/a |
| FY2024 | $26.8M | +53% |
| FY2025 | $134.0M | +399% |
| Q2 2026 | $131.4M | vs. $7.5M |
| Q3 2026 | $233.3M | +321% |
| FY2026 guide | at least $650M | ~4.9x |
Management's ambition is a $1 billion international run rate in 2027, and it claims the number one or two position in the UK, Germany and Australia. Two costs come with it. Brand migrations (Juniper and Pilot folding toward Hers and Hims) cost subscribers this quarter, and price cuts in the UK and Germany are part of why the EBITDA guide came down. International weight loss is also branded weight loss, and it carries the same lower margin.
4. Wholesale and the new specialties
Wholesale (Hims products on retail shelves) is small and shrinking: $29.6 million in 2023, $38.6 million in 2024, $36.2 million in 2025, and the company says it does not plan new material retail partnerships. The new specialties are where management wants the next leg to come from:
| Line | What exists today | Size disclosed |
|---|---|---|
| Wholesale | Retail partners, stable list | $36.2M FY2025 |
| Testosterone | Testosterone therapy (a Schedule III drug) | Approaching $100M annualized run rate |
| Labs | Trybe Labs, YourBio at-home blood draw | Not disclosed |
| Peptides+ | Sermorelin, glutathione, NAD+; in-house API plant | Launches late Nov; not material in Q4 |
The peptide line is the one with a real margin story. Hims owns a plant that makes the active ingredient, so a peptide sold through Peptides+ looks like the old compounded model: the company's own product, its own pharmacy, its own price. The regulatory footing is thin. In April the FDA removed 12 peptides from its Category 2 "significant safety concerns" list and scheduled its compounding advisory committee for July to consider seven peptides, including BPC-157 and TB-500. Law firms reading the April action, Goodwin among them, note that removal from Category 2 does not by itself make a peptide eligible for compounding. Hims leaves BPC-157 and TB-500 out of the launch and says it will add them when the regulatory environment permits.
This is the section that changed my mind about the quarter. Revenue grew 49%. Gross profit grew 15%, from $442.1 million to $509.2 million. The gap between those two numbers is the drug cost of branded GLP-1s, plus the acquired international businesses that run at lower margins. The cleanest way I found to see it is to multiply the company's own two disclosed numbers, monthly revenue per average subscriber and gross margin, to get gross profit per subscriber per month. This is my arithmetic on reported figures:
| Period | Monthly revenue / avg. sub | Gross margin | Gross profit / sub / month |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $56 | 82% | ~$46 |
| FY2024 | $65 | 79% | ~$52 |
| FY2025 | $83 | 74% | ~$61 |
| Q2 2025 | $76 | 76% | ~$58 |
| Q3 2025 | $81 | 74% | ~$60 |
| Q4 2025 | $83 | 72% | ~$60 |
| Q1 2026 | $80 | 65% | ~$52 |
| Q2 2026 | $92 | 64% | ~$59 |
| Q3 2026 | $105 | 57% | ~$60 |
From 2023 to 2025 the number rose by a third, from about $46 to about $61. That was the compounding era: more revenue per member at a margin that held in the high 70s. Since the middle of 2025 the line has run between $52 and $60, dipping in Q1 2026 when the pivot to branded drugs began and recovering only to where it started. Over the past year every dollar of the 30% rise in revenue per subscriber was offset by the margin falling. The release leads with revenue per subscriber; marketing gets paid out of gross profit per subscriber.
The organic picture may be flatter still. Eucalyptus contributed about $135 million of Q3 revenue and the company does not disclose its margin. If Eucalyptus runs anywhere between 45% and 65% gross margin (my assumption, bracketing the group's 57%), it contributed $61 to $88 million of gross profit, which leaves the rest of the company with $421 to $448 million against $442 million a year ago. On that estimate, the business Hims owned in Q3 2025 grew its gross profit by somewhere between minus 5% and plus 1%.
Then follow the gross profit down the income statement. In Q3 marketing took $247.3 million, operations and support $107.2 million, technology $69.4 million, and general and administrative $151.5 million. Stock compensation, spread through those lines, was $64.5 million, up from $40.2 million a year ago. Adjusted EBITDA of $82.4 million is what remains after adding the stock compensation back. Take it out and the quarter produced about $18 million.
Why does any of this matter to the stock? Because the bull case on HIMS rests on operating leverage: the 2030 target of $1.3 billion of adjusted EBITDA on $6.5 billion of revenue is a 20% margin, against 9% today. Operating leverage comes from gross profit per member growing faster than the cost of acquiring and serving that member. For six quarters it has not grown at all. The mechanisms that could restart it are real and named: multi-condition members (a weight-loss patient who adds testosterone or a lab panel), the peptide line made in-house, and membership fees that scale independently of the drug price. Until one shows up in this number, I read 49% revenue growth as 49% growth in Lilly's and Novo's revenue that happens to be booked at Hims.
Eucalyptus is the largest deal Hims has ever done, and its structure shapes the stock for the next year. The 10-Q gives the accounting:
| Component | Amount | Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Cash at closing | $225.0M | Paid June 2026 |
| Deferred payments | $683.9M | Six quarterly installments to 1 Dec 2027 |
| Earn-out (fair value) | $59.6M | Up to $96.6M on 2026–2028 revenue and EBITDA |
| Accounting price | $968.5M | Headline "up to $1.15B" |
| Goodwill recognized | $790.3M | 82% of the price |
Hims paid the first deferred installment, $130.3 million, in cash in Q3. At 30 September the balance sheet carried $478.6 million of deferred acquisition payments due within a year and $84.5 million beyond that, $563.1 million in total, plus $170.8 million of earn-out liabilities across Zava, Medici, YourBio and Eucalyptus. The working capital deficit of $114.8 million, against a $363.2 million surplus at the start of the year, is mostly this bill. Cash and short-term investments are $712.2 million.
The detail that matters is the settlement option. The company can pay "a significant majority" of the deferred and earn-out consideration in Class A shares instead of cash, capped at 19.9% of Class A shares outstanding, which is about 45 million shares. A dollar-denominated obligation paid in stock is reflexive: the lower the price, the more shares it takes. Applied to the $563 million of deferred payments:
| Share price | Shares to settle $563M | % of 234.4M basic |
|---|---|---|
| $15.00 | 37.5M | 16.0% |
| $19.73 | 28.5M | 12.2% |
| $25.00 | 22.5M | 9.6% |
| $30.00 | 18.8M | 8.0% |
Hims can also pay in cash, and it has the cash to pay a good part of it. Paying it all in cash would take most of the $712 million on hand, in a year when free cash flow through nine months was $10.8 million. The likeliest path, in my view, is a mix, and a market that knows the sellers may receive stock in quarterly lumps has a reason to lean on the price before each installment. I treat the full $563 million as debt in my valuation, which is equivalent in value to issuing the shares at a fair price, and I watch each quarterly installment for which currency it was paid in.
On the price itself: Eucalyptus reported a run rate above $450 million at signing (measured on January 2026 gross fulfilled billings), and its Q3 contribution of about $135 million annualizes to roughly $540 million. At $968.5 million, Hims paid about 1.8 times that run rate. For a business that had served more than 775,000 customers by February, that is a reasonable price. What I object to is the currency and the timing: a bill that can be paid in stock falls due over the eighteen months when the stock is at its weakest.
The best bull argument I found is in a market most investors ignore. Generic semaglutide launched in Canada in 2026, after Novo's Canadian patent protection ended. On the call, management said average monthly weight-loss orders there grew more than 50% and that margins improved from the mix, and described Canada as an early view of how it thinks weight loss will evolve everywhere. The logic is clean. When the molecule becomes a commodity, the price falls, more people start and stay on treatment, and the company that owns the customer relationship keeps a bigger share of each prescription because the drug is no longer the scarce input. A platform with its own pharmacies and 2.8 million members is built for that world.
The same logic explains why both Novo and Lilly now sell through Hims after years of fighting it. Lilly says one in three new patients starting a branded weight-loss drug in 2025 paid cash for Zepbound vials. Once two manufacturers compete for the cash-pay patient, the patient's front door gains bargaining power, and Hims has the most visible front door in the category. Pills help too: the Wegovy pill and Foundayo remove the cold-chain shipping that made injectables expensive to fulfill.
Two things keep me from paying for the preview now. First, it runs on a patent schedule. Novo's own lawsuit cited a US semaglutide patent that expires on 5 December 2031. Canada, and later other international markets, will see generics years before the US does, and the US is still 74% of revenue. Between now and then Hims earns a retail margin on someone else's patent. Second, the front door is less exclusive than it looks. LifeMD, a far smaller rival, announced arrangements with both Novo and Lilly to dispense Wegovy, the Wegovy pill, Ozempic, Zepbound and Foundayo. Access to the branded drugs is a feature every serious cash-pay platform will have. What Hims has that the others lack is brand, scale in customer acquisition and its own pharmacy footprint, and those show up in gross profit per member, which is the number that has not moved.
I built a six-year DCF from 2027 to 2032. Free cash flow is adjusted EBITDA less stock compensation, less capital expenditure, less cash tax at 15% on positive operating profit after depreciation. I treat stock compensation as a cash cost on purpose: my share count includes only grants already made, so future grants have to be paid for somewhere, and here they are paid for in the cash flow.
Assumptions. Revenue grows 20% in 2027 (Q4 2026 guidance annualizes to about $3.5 billion, and the international book adds a full year of Eucalyptus), then 17%, 15%, 12%, 10% and 8%, reaching $5.7 billion in 2030, or 87% of management's $6.5 billion target. Adjusted EBITDA margin rises from 10% to 17.5%, short of management's 20% because gross margin has reset from the mid-70s to the high 50s and I do not assume it returns. Stock compensation falls from 6.5% of revenue to 3.5%. Capital expenditure runs at 4% of revenue in 2027 and 3% from 2030, and depreciation at about 4%. Discount rate (WACC) 12%: the measured beta is 2.5, which I consider inflated by the compounding saga; at a beta near 1.6, a 4.2% risk-free rate and a 5% equity premium the cost of equity is about 12%, and the convertible notes carry no coupon to lower it. Terminal growth 3%.
| Year | Revenue | Growth | EBITDA | Margin | FCF | Disc. FCF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2027 | $3,768M | 20% | $377M | 10.0% | −$19M | −$17M |
| 2028 | $4,409M | 17% | $529M | 12.0% | $116M | $92M |
| 2029 | $5,070M | 15% | $710M | 14.0% | $269M | $191M |
| 2030 | $5,678M | 12% | $909M | 16.0% | $443M | $281M |
| 2031 | $6,246M | 10% | $1,062M | 17.0% | $562M | $319M |
| 2032 | $6,746M | 8% | $1,181M | 17.5% | $641M | $325M |
Discounted cash flows sum to $1.19 billion. The terminal value is $7.33 billion, worth $3.72 billion today. Enterprise value: $4.91 billion. From that I subtract $1.42 billion of net debt and debt-like obligations: $1.40 billion of convertible notes at face, $563 million of deferred acquisition payments, $171 million of earn-outs, less $712 million of cash and investments. Leases ($193 million) stay out, since their cost already sits in operating expenses. Equity value is $3.48 billion, or $13.22 per share on a fully diluted count of 263.6 million shares.
| Share count component (30 Sep 2026; cover date for shares outstanding) | Shares |
|---|---|
| Class A outstanding (6 Nov 2026) | 226,034,799 |
| Class V outstanding | 8,377,623 |
| Employee stock options (weighted exercise price $6.29) | 4,063,000 |
| CEO performance options, vested and in the money ($2.43 and $5.01) | 3,725,715 |
| CEO performance options, unvested at target ($34.71 and $25.88) | 1,222,700 |
| Unvested RSUs | 19,178,000 |
| Unvested PRSUs at target | 950,770 |
| Fully diluted | 263,552,607 |
The fully diluted count is 16.6% above the 226.0 million Class A shares that most quote screens use. Options are counted gross, without crediting exercise proceeds of about $40 million, which is conservative by about $0.15 a share. Two items are deliberately left out of the count because they sit in net debt instead: the 27.8 million shares underlying the convertible notes (out of the money at $29.53 and $70.67, so I carry the notes at their $1.40 billion face) and any shares issued to settle the Eucalyptus payments. Carrying the 0% notes at a 7% present value instead of face would add about $1.27 a share.
Sensitivity, per share:
| WACC | g = 2% | g = 3% | g = 4% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10% | $17.00 | $19.70 | $23.30 |
| 11% | $14.04 | $16.04 | $18.62 |
| 12% | $11.68 | $13.22 | $15.13 |
| 13% | $9.77 | $10.97 | $12.44 |
| 14% | $8.19 | $9.14 | $10.29 |
Two variants frame the base. If I take management's 2030 plan at face ($6.5 billion of revenue and a 20% margin by 2030, holding 21% after) with the same discount rate and the same treatment of stock compensation, the DCF gives about $23 ($22.94 on the path I used; the exact figure moves by a few tens of cents with how the margin ramps). If I keep my base assumptions but ignore stock compensation entirely, as adjusted EBITDA does, it gives $20.78. The current price of $19.73 sits just under both. The stock today is priced for one of two buyers: one who believes management's plan, or one who treats $250 million a year of stock compensation as free.
Multiple sanity check. At $19.73 the enterprise value, using my debt-like total, is $6.62 billion. That is 2.3 times trailing revenue of $2.87 billion, 24.8 times the 2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance midpoint of $267 million, and 16.6 times the roughly $400 million of 2027 adjusted EBITDA the Street had modeled before this week, a figure that needs about 50% growth off the new 2026 midpoint. On gross profit it looks cheaper: my estimate of 2026 gross profit is $1.88 billion (Q4 at a 56% margin), so the stock trades at 3.5 times gross profit. That is the number a bull will quote, and it is fair only if gross profit per member starts growing again.
The obvious private comparison is Ro, which does not report. The only listed pure-play in US cash-pay telehealth is LifeMD, and it reported its own third quarter on 12 November, three days after Hims. The comparison is lopsided on size and that is the point: it shows what the business looks like without scale.
| Q3 2026 | HIMS | LFMD |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $890.4M (+49%) | $44.6M (−7%) |
| Gross margin | 57% | ~82% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $82.4M (9%) | −$0.4M |
| Subscribers | 2.79M (+13%) | 350K (+13%) |
| Monthly revenue per subscriber | $105 | ~$43 (my calculation) |
| Cash | $712.2M | $21.9M |
| Borrowings | $1.40B converts (0%) | $12.5M term loan (after Q3) |
| FY2026 revenue guide | $3.13–3.15B | $188–191M (cut) |
| EV / trailing revenue | ~2.3x | ~0.4x |
| Capability | HIMS | LFMD |
|---|---|---|
| Novo branded GLP-1s | Yes (Wegovy pill and pen, Ozempic) | Yes (dispensing) |
| Lilly branded GLP-1s | Yes (Zepbound, Foundayo) | Yes (dispensing) |
| Own pharmacies | Two 503A, a 503B, two UK | LifeMD Pharmacy |
| International | UK, DE, IE, FR, ES, CA, AU, JP | US only |
| In-house API (peptides) | Yes | Not disclosed |
| Enterprise channel | None disclosed | AT&T employee and customer access |
Three things stand out. First, both companies grew subscribers 13%, and LifeMD's revenue still fell. Membership growth without a rising value per member is a treadmill, and LifeMD is the cautionary version of what Hims's flat gross profit per member could become at a smaller scale. Second, LifeMD's 82% gross margin on about $43 a month is the old Hims model at a smaller scale: low revenue per member, high margin per dollar. Hims has moved to the opposite end, with more revenue per member at a much lower margin per dollar. Third, the capability table shows how little of Hims's advantage comes from drug access. Both companies dispense both makers' GLP-1s. Hims wins on the things the table cannot price: a brand that spends $247 million a quarter on marketing and gets 2.8 million people to pay, a pharmacy footprint on three continents, and an in-house ingredient plant.
What would LifeMD need to catch up? Roughly $250 million of quarterly marketing it cannot fund, international licenses, and a decade of brand. It will stay small. The lesson I take from it points back at Hims: in cash-pay telehealth the scale leader takes the market, and the market still punishes it when unit economics stall. LifeMD at about 0.4 times revenue (a $106 million market cap on $21.9 million of cash and no debt at quarter end) is where a stalled cash-pay platform trades. Hims at 2.3 times revenue is pricing a restart of per-member growth.
The FTC case, now with seven states. The FTC sued on 29 July, alleging that from 2019 into 2025 Hims made cancellation needlessly hard, charged customers without clear disclosure, and shared sensitive health data with advertising platforms including Meta and Snap. On 10 November the complaint was amended: Arizona, Florida, Nebraska, Ohio and Wisconsin joined California and Utah, the count total went from 9 to 16, and newly unredacted figures allege about 14 million customer email addresses uploaded to Meta between 2020 and 2023 and a September 2023 message from two customer service agents calling the cancellation path "a bit of a dark pattern." The company has accrued about $60 million and says it cannot estimate losses beyond that. State statutes run from $2,000 to $50,000 per violation. A follow-on consumer class action asserts privacy claims on the same facts, and a new securities suit (Velanki) covers buyers from August 2025 to July 2026. The motion to dismiss is set for hearing on 14 January 2027.
The drugmakers hold the leash. Novo dismissed its patent suit without giving up the right to refile it. Lilly's deal gives Hims no price advantage over LillyDirect and binds Hims never to compound Lilly's molecules. Both manufacturers run their own direct-to-patient channels. If either decides the platform is steering patients in ways it dislikes, as Novo decided in June 2025, the branded weight-loss line can shrink in a week.
The 2030 notes are debt in all but name. The $1.0 billion of 0% notes converts at $70.67, 3.6 times today's price, and matures on 15 May 2030. Unless the stock more than triples, that is $1 billion to repay or refinance in three and a half years, from a business whose free cash flow through nine months was $10.8 million and which also owes $563 million to acquisition sellers before the end of 2027. Zero coupon makes the notes cheap to carry and expensive to roll: a refinancing in 2029 or 2030 prices off the credit of the company as it is then.
Dilution from three directions. Stock compensation of $64.5 million a quarter, with $487 million of unrecognized RSU expense still to come. Up to about 45 million shares issuable to settle the Eucalyptus obligations. And 27.8 million shares under the convertible notes, relevant if the stock ever recovers past $29.53. The fully diluted count is already 16.6% above the Class A count.
Margins may not come back. Gross margin went from 76% in Q2 2025 to 57% in Q3 2026, and management says declines should "moderate," which is a long way from saying they reverse. Adjusted EBITDA guidance has been cut three times this year, from a $300 to $375 million range in February to $257 to $277 million now. A fourth cut would take the 2030 target with it.
The subscriber decline may run longer than one more quarter. The CFO has already warned of another quarter of subscriber headwinds. The company is betting that a January marketing push, multi-month plans and the Lilly products restart growth in Q1 2027, historically its heaviest acquisition quarter. If Q1 does not restart it, the deliberate-pacing explanation stops working.
Regulatory exposure in the new lines. Peptides depend on an FDA process that has not produced a compounding pathway for the most popular molecules. Testosterone is a Schedule III controlled substance, with the prescribing and diversion obligations that brings. In Australia, the TGA has been investigating Eucalyptus subsidiaries over 2023 and 2024 advertising of prescription medicines; Hims holds an indemnity from the sellers.
Management's own record. The February 2026 pill was announced, attacked by the FDA and withdrawn inside three days. The June 2025 Novo breakup produced a securities class action. A company that runs at this speed will keep producing these episodes, and each one resets the multiple downward first and asks questions later.
Hims is a real business. It has 2.8 million paying members, a brand that two of the world's largest drugmakers now sell through, its own pharmacies on three continents, positive free cash flow this year, and a CEO who built all of it from a hair-loss subscription in nine years. If I were judging the company I would be more generous than I am about the stock.
For the stock, the numbers decide it. Gross profit per member is about $60 a month, where it was a year ago, and has not been higher in six quarters. Stock compensation absorbs most of adjusted EBITDA. The balance sheet that held no debt two years ago now carries $1.4 billion of convertible notes and a $563 million acquisition bill that can be paid in shares. My DCF, giving management most of its revenue plan and treating stock compensation as a real cost, comes out at $13.22. Management's own plan, taken at face, comes out near $23. At $19.73 the market is already paying for most of the plan, the week after the plan was cut.
So I call it a value trap at this price: cheap against its 200-week line, cheap on revenue and gross profit, and fairly priced or worse on what those dollars become per member and per share. The evidence that would change my mind is specific. Gross profit per subscriber, which I will compute each quarter from the same two disclosed numbers, needs to break above $64. Subscribers need to be back above 2.9 million. The Eucalyptus installments need to be paid in cash.
The checkpoints come in order. Peptides+ launches in late November. The motion to dismiss the FTC case is heard on 14 January 2027. Each quarterly Eucalyptus installment through 1 December 2027 shows up in the cash flow statement or the share count. The fourth-quarter print, expected around 1 March 2027, brings the Q4 subscriber count, the 2027 guidance and the longer-term metrics management has promised. That print is the next real test.
Revenue is up 49% because Lilly's and Novo's drugs now pass through the till, while gross profit per member is about $60 a month, no higher than a year ago. At $19.73 the market still pays for most of management's 2030 plan, in the week that plan lost its third EBITDA guide, with a $563 million acquisition bill that can be settled in stock.
The gauge runs the other way from the usual setup on this site: the anchor sits below the price. I built it as the midpoint of two DCFs that share every mechanical assumption (12% WACC, 3% terminal growth, stock compensation as a cost, $1.42 billion of debt-like obligations, 263.6 million diluted shares) and differ only on the operating plan. Mine gives management 87% of its 2030 revenue and a 16% margin that year; theirs is $6.5 billion at 20%. The midpoint, $18.08, is where I think a fair buyer lands if they weight the plan at even odds. The stock is 9% above it, so the anchor implies 8% downside.
Sell-side targets run from $23 to $40, with a mean of $28.31 across 13 analysts. Those were mostly built on a 2027 adjusted EBITDA near $400 million, which now needs about 50% growth off the cut 2026 midpoint. I give them no separate weight until 2027 guidance arrives.
Drivers the metrics don't show yet, scored materiality × unpriced × low-attention × linkage. Net lean negative: the two capital-structure and unit-economics risks outweigh the three positives, which are real but further out.
Q3 2026, reported 9 November
Guidance and balance sheet
| Scenario | Multiple | Implied | Path |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 10× on $330M | ~$7.10 | Subscribers keep falling into Q1, a fourth EBITDA cut, FTC settles large, Eucalyptus paid in stock below $15 |
| Base | 14× on $377M | ~$14.60 | Growth near 20%, margin up a point a year, per-member gross profit flat (close to my $13.22 DCF) |
| Bull | 18× on $421M | ~$23.35 | Q1 restarts subscriber growth, peptides and TRT lift per-member gross profit, 2030 plan back on track |
The steelman, given equal room. My call already leans bear, so this tab argues the short case harder than I do.
Hims & Hers spent 2024 and 2025 earning a compounder's margin on a drug it did not invent, during a shortage it did not create, and the market capitalized that margin as if it were a platform. The shortage ended. The patent holder sued. The company tried one more compounded product, a $49 pill aimed straight at Novo's launch, and withdrew it inside three days under threat from the FDA. What remains is a reseller: Hims now sells Novo's and Lilly's drugs at Novo's and Lilly's prices, with Lilly contractually barring it from ever compounding Lilly's molecules, and it keeps a membership fee for the trouble. Gross margin has gone from 76% to 57% in five quarters and has further to fall as the branded mix keeps rising and Eucalyptus consolidates for a full year.
The growth is bought and passed through. Revenue up 49% is gross profit up 15%, and the organic part of that gross profit, on any reasonable margin for Eucalyptus, did not grow at all. Subscribers fell for the first time, and the CFO has pre-announced another quarter of the same. Management calls it deliberate pacing. A subscription business that has to stop marketing to protect its margin has told you what its marginal customer is worth. And the per-member number already showed what the pivot costs: when the drug mix flipped in Q1 2026, gross profit per subscriber fell to about $52 a month, and the recovery since has only brought it back to where it was a year ago.
Below gross profit the picture worsens. Stock compensation runs at $258 million annualized and consumed $64.5 million of the $82.4 million of adjusted EBITDA in Q3. GAAP losses total $211 million for nine months. The adjusted EBITDA guide has been cut three times in one year, from a $337.5 million midpoint to $267 million, and the 2030 target of $1.3 billion now requires a near-fivefold increase in four years from a business whose unit economics have stalled.
The balance sheet turned in 21 months from no debt to $1.4 billion of convertible notes, plus $563 million owed to acquisition sellers that the company can pay in stock. The billion due in May 2030 converts at $70.67, so in practice it is a bullet maturity that a company with $10.8 million of nine-month free cash flow will have to refinance. At $15 that is 16% dilution on top of 29 million options and RSUs already outstanding. The FTC, now joined by seven states, is litigating the core machinery of the business, how it signs people up, charges them and lets them leave, with unredacted allegations of a cancellation path two of its own customer service agents called "a bit of a dark pattern" and 14 million customer emails sent to Meta. An injunction that forces simple cancellation would raise churn across every specialty at once. And the drugmakers, who own the molecules and run their own direct channels, can close the shelf whenever the partnership stops suiting them, which Novo has already done once. A short at $19.73 is a bet that the equity is the residual claim on a reseller with a litigation bill, a stock-settled acquisition bill and a stock-compensation habit. On my bear inputs (growth fading to 4% and margins stuck near 10%), the DCF leaves nothing for the equity at all.
The bull re-rate needs the market to see Hims as the front door of cash-pay medicine, valued on members and lifetime value. The market has already watched that story run to $68.74 and collapse to $14.52 within a year, and it will want proof in reported numbers before paying for it again. The proof the bulls point to keeps moving: compounded GLP-1s, then the Novo deal, then international, then peptides. Each new line arrives with its own regulatory question, and the stock trades on the last headline. With 26% of the float short and a beta of 2.5, rallies on deal news (36% on the Novo dismissal, 8% on the Lilly day) have tended to fade: the stock was back under its 200-week line two weeks after the Novo rally, and gave back the Lilly pop the next session. The precedent that matters is LifeMD: same drugs, same channel, members up 13%, revenue down 7%, and an enterprise value under half a year's sales. Scale buys Hims a better version of that outcome, and the multiple has room to compress toward it.
These are the conditions under which my value-trap call is wrong. If two or more happen, I will say so in a dated note.
| Gross profit per subscriber per month (reported monthly revenue per average subscriber × reported gross margin) above $64 in Q4 2026 or Q1 2027 |
| Subscribers at or above 2.90 million in the Q1 2027 report (expected around May 2027) |
| FY2027 adjusted EBITDA guidance with a midpoint of $400M or more at the Q4 print (~1 Mar 2027), and FY2026 delivered inside $257–277M |
| Every Eucalyptus deferred installment through the Q1 2027 report paid in cash, with no new convertible or equity raise |
| The FTC motion to dismiss granted in substantial part at or after the 14 January 2027 hearing |