The Uranium Supercycle: Who Wins, Who Gets Squeezed, and Where the Framework Finds an Edge

A mungbeans.io framework analysis — March 15, 2026

This Is Not a Sesame Seed. This Is the Whole Plant.

In our Sesame Seed Trades analysis of the Strait of Hormuz crisis, we mapped seven butterfly-effect chains — helium, fertilizer, tankers, petrochemicals, insurance, EVs, and uranium. Six of them fit the sesame seed format: a downstream cascade pushing stocks toward or away from their 200-week moving averages.

Uranium didn’t fit. The thesis is too big, the data too deep, and the implications too serious for a single chain in a broader article. The Strait closure isn’t creating the uranium trade — it’s accelerating a supercycle that’s been building for five years. This deserves its own analysis.

The Supply Squeeze Nobody Can Fix Quickly

Global uranium demand is approximately 170 million pounds per year and growing ¹. Global mine production covers roughly 145 million pounds ². The 25-million-pound annual gap has been filled by drawdowns of secondary supplies — government stockpiles, underfeeding enrichment tails, recycled military material ³. Those secondary supplies are depleting. The Megatons to Megawatts program (recycled Russian warheads) is exhausted. Government stockpiles outside China are being drawn down. The market looks balanced at 170 = 145 + 25, but it’s balanced on a knife’s edge — and demand is only going up while secondary sources are only going down.

Russia controls approximately 44% of global uranium enrichment capacity through Rosatom’s TENEX subsidiary ⁴. The 2024 ban on Russian enriched uranium imports to the US (signed into law, effective 2028 with waivers expiring in phases) ⁵ means American utilities need to find alternative enrichment — and there isn’t enough. The only Western enrichment capacity is Urenco (European consortium) and Centrus Energy (LEU) in the US, and they’re booked solid for years.

Meanwhile, Kazatomprom — Kazakhstan’s state miner producing 43% of the world’s uranium ² — announced production cuts in 2026 due to sulfuric acid shortages and construction delays at new mines ⁶. You can’t respond to a supply deficit by cutting supply. But that’s what’s happening.

The demand side is even more relentless. Japan is restarting reactors (Unit 6 of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa came online February 9 — 1,356 MW) ⁷. China has 27 reactors under construction. India has 8 ⁸. The US has extended the lives of nearly its entire fleet, and Vogtle Units 3 and 4 (the first new US reactors in 30 years) are now operational. AI data center demand is driving utilities like Constellation Energy (CEG) and Vistra (VST) to sign long-term nuclear power purchase agreements at premium rates.

Each reactor consumes roughly 400,000–500,000 pounds of uranium per year ³. Each restart or new build adds permanent, inflexible demand. This isn’t a cyclical commodity — once a reactor loads fuel, it needs uranium every 18–24 months for the next 60 years.

The Numbers: Who Needs How Much, and Who Has It

Let’s get specific about the global competition for uranium. These are the buyers, all drawing from the same ~145 million pounds of annual mine production:

Total demand: ~170 Mlbs/year. Total mine supply: ~145 Mlbs/year. The gap is filled by secondary sources — underfeeding enrichment tails, recycled military material, government stockpile drawdowns — that contribute roughly 25 Mlbs/year. But those secondary sources are depleting. The recycled military material (Megatons to Megawatts) is exhausted. Government stockpiles are being drawn down, not built up (except China’s). Underfeeding is constrained by the enrichment bottleneck.

The market looks balanced on paper: 145 + 25 = 170. But that balance is fragile. Remove any single source — Kazatomprom cutting production, Russia sanctions tightening, a single mine disruption — and demand exceeds supply. And demand is only growing: China’s 27 reactors under construction each add ~500,000 lbs/year of permanent demand when they come online. Japan’s restart program adds another 5–15 Mlbs/year over the next decade. New US builds at Vogtle are already consuming uranium. AI data center contracts are accelerating reactor life extensions and potential restarts.

The US and EU are in roughly the same position on inventory — both sitting on about 2.2–2.6 years of supply ¹¹. The difference isn’t the stockpile size; it’s everything else. The US produces only ~2 million pounds domestically ¹⁰, meeting 4% of its own reactor requirements. It imports 96% of its uranium ¹⁰, primarily from Canada, Kazakhstan, Australia, and Russia. EU utilities generally hold longer-term enrichment and supply contracts through Urenco and Orano, giving them more forward coverage. And critically, the US government is now competing against its own utilities for supply, purchasing uranium from Energy Fuels and Uranium Energy Corp for the Strategic Uranium Reserve ¹². China, meanwhile, holds 12 years of inventory ¹¹ — a strategic buffer that no Western nation comes close to matching.

The 2028 Cliff: When the Contracts Run Out

Here’s the EIA data that should terrify every nuclear utility CFO. The US Energy Information Administration tracks “unfilled requirements” — how much uranium US utilities need but don’t have contracts for ⁹:

Read that 2028 line. Unfilled requirements jump 3.4x in a single year — from 3.4 million pounds to 11.5 million pounds. Why? Because 2028 is when the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act fully kicks in. Russian enriched uranium, which has been filling a significant portion of US utility needs, gets cut off. And the utilities haven’t contracted replacement supply.

At current spot ($86/lb), 11.5 million uncovered pounds costs $989 million on the spot market. At $200/lb, it’s $2.3 billion. At $300/lb, it’s $3.45 billion. That’s just the US. Globally, cumulative uncovered requirements through 2045 total approximately 3.1 billion pounds ¹³ — and the industry has been contracting below replacement rate for 13 consecutive years ¹⁴.

The contracting numbers tell the story of a market in denial. In 2025, utilities placed 116 million pounds under long-term contracts ¹⁴. The theoretical replacement rate — what you need to contract annually just to maintain coverage — is ~150 million pounds ¹⁴. They fell short by 34 million pounds. In a single year. They’ve been falling short for 13 years running. The cumulative hole is now 3.1 billion pounds deep.

This isn’t a market where utilities can casually sign new contracts at reasonable prices. This is a market where everyone needs the same uranium, the supply is constrained, the government is competing with you, China has locked up 12 years of reserves while you’re running on 2.2 years, and the biggest single source of enriched uranium (Russia) just got banned.

The Utility Squeeze — The Other Side of the Uranium Bull Case

Here’s the part the uranium bulls don’t talk about: if you’re right that uranium is going to spike, then the buyers of uranium are in serious trouble. And the buyers are the nuclear utilities.

The contracts rolling off were signed at $40–50/lb ⁹. New term contracts — if utilities can even get them — are at $75–86/lb and climbing, with long-term prices hitting a 14-year high of $86.50/lb in December 2025 ¹⁴. And the utilities who let their inventories deplete? They’re buying at spot ($90+/lb) to keep their reactors fueled. Spot hit $100/lb in January 2026 before pulling back.

And it’s not just the raw U3O8. Nuclear fuel has four cost components: uranium purchase, conversion (U3O8 to UF6), enrichment (SWU), and fabrication into fuel assemblies. Enrichment is where the Russia bottleneck really bites — SWU costs have spiked from ~$110 historically to $170+ today, with 44% of global enrichment capacity sanctioned. Conversion and fabrication add another ~$57M per GW of capacity per year. The total fuel bill per GW of nuclear capacity has already jumped from ~$91M/year under old contracts to ~$118M/year at current spot — and that’s before uranium goes higher.

What Happens When Uranium Goes to $200. Or $300.

Let’s stop hand-waving about “5–10% of operating costs” and actually model what happens to utility earnings at the uranium prices the supply-demand picture is pointing toward. The government is now competing against utilities for the same feedstock, stockpiling uranium as a critical mineral for the naval fleet. Kazatomprom is cutting production into a deficit. Russia is sanctioned. No new mines are coming online for years. $200/lb isn’t a panic scenario — it’s a plausible sustained price. $300/lb is a plausible spike. We model both below, then stress-test the assumptions.

Here’s the total nuclear fuel cost per GW of capacity per year, at various uranium/enrichment price scenarios:

At old contract prices, fuel was $11.57/MWh — roughly a third of a plant’s total operating cost of ~$30–35/MWh. Manageable. At $300/lb uranium, fuel alone hits $29.67/MWh — nearly the entire previous operating cost of the plant. At $500/lb, fuel cost exceeds what the plant used to spend on everything.

Now apply these numbers to actual utilities. The column that matters is “% of Net Income” — this is how much of each utility’s current earnings get eaten by the fuel cost increase versus what they were paying under old contracts:

At $200/lb uranium (stress scenario):

At $300/lb uranium (extreme scenario):

Read that CEG line again. At $300/lb uranium, Constellation’s fuel cost increase exceeds its entire net income. This is the company that’s +63.6% above its 200WMA, trading at 41x earnings, because the market thinks “nuclear renaissance” means every nuclear stock goes up. But Constellation isn’t a uranium producer. It’s the world’s largest uranium consumer. The Microsoft PPA deal doesn’t hedge fuel costs — it guarantees power delivery at a fixed rate while input costs explode underneath it. The more reactors you operate, the more uranium you need to buy, and the worse the squeeze gets.

Vistra (VST) is the other landmine. At +82.4% above the line — the most extended nuclear utility — a $200/lb uranium scenario wipes out 29% of net income. At $300/lb, it’s 46%. Vistra only operates 2.4 GW of nuclear (Comanche Peak), but its net income is only $752M. The nuclear fleet is a larger percentage of Vistra’s earnings base than it is for diversified giants like Southern Company or NextEra.

PPL Corporation (PPL, $38.51) sits at +34.5% above its 200WMA with a forward P/E of 18.2x. Susquehanna’s 2.5 GW eats a $224M fuel cost increase at $200/lb — 19% of net income. PPL is a regulated utility, so it can eventually pass fuel costs to ratepayers through rate cases. But “eventually” means 12–18 months of regulatory lag. In the interim, shareholders eat the difference. And rate cases aren’t guaranteed — regulators can push back, delay, or cap increases, especially when consumers are already dealing with inflation.

The key insight: The utilities with the most nuclear capacity relative to their earnings — CEG and VST — are the most vulnerable and the most extended above their 200WMAs. This isn’t a coincidence. The market has bid these stocks up because of their nuclear exposure, without pricing in the input cost side of the equation. The narrative is “nuclear power = premium.” The math says “nuclear power = uranium buyer in a seller’s market.”

Model It Yourself

The tables above use fixed scenarios. Use the calculator below to set any uranium spot price and SWU cost and see the impact on each utility in real time:

Stress-Testing the Thesis: What Actually Happens

The tables above model worst-case arithmetic. Before you short Constellation, we owe you the harder questions: Are these prices realistic? Would utilities actually keep running at a loss? And what about the enrichment bottleneck that makes the raw uranium price almost beside the point?

The Enrichment Problem Is Worse Than the Uranium Problem

Here’s what most uranium analysis misses: even if a utility secures yellowcake at a reasonable price, it can’t put it in a reactor. Raw U3O8 has to be converted to UF6 gas, then enriched to 3–5% U-235 concentration, then fabricated into fuel assemblies. That process takes 18–24 months from purchase to loaded fuel rod. And the enrichment step is where the entire supply chain breaks.

Global enrichment capacity is roughly 60 million SWU per year ⁴. Russia (Rosatom/TENEX) controls ~44% of that — about 26 million SWU. Urenco (UK/Netherlands/Germany consortium) provides ~18 million SWU. Orano (France) adds ~7.5 million SWU. Centrus Energy (LEU) in the US produces a small and growing amount, but its current capacity is a rounding error against global demand ¹⁵. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has significant capacity but uses it domestically — none is available to Western utilities.

When the Russian ban takes full effect in 2028, Western utilities lose access to 26 million SWU of annual enrichment capacity. Urenco and Orano are already booked years out. Centrus is scaling HALEU production for next-gen reactors, not conventional enrichment. There is no spare Western enrichment capacity. A utility could be sitting on a mountain of yellowcake and still not be able to fuel its reactors because there’s nobody to enrich it.

This is why the SWU price has spiked from ~$110 to $170+ and keeps climbing. It’s also why our fuel cost model includes SWU as a separate variable — the enrichment squeeze is a distinct cost driver from the uranium squeeze, and they compound. A utility facing $200/lb uranium and $300/SWU is in a fundamentally different position than one facing $200/lb uranium with legacy enrichment contracts still in place.

Would Utilities Actually Run Reactors at a Loss?

Mostly yes. Shutting down a nuclear reactor costs $500 million to $1 billion in decommissioning and takes a decade to complete. Once you shut down, restarting requires full NRC relicensing — a multi-year process with no guaranteed outcome. Utilities also have grid capacity obligations and, in many cases, long-term PPAs that contractually require power delivery. Constellation’s Microsoft deal, for example, commits power delivery regardless of what it costs to produce. Walking away means eating the decommissioning bill and breaching power contracts.

This isn’t hypothetical. Between 2013 and 2021, a dozen US reactors shut down — Indian Point, Vermont Yankee, Pilgrim, Kewaunee — because cheap natural gas made them uneconomic. But those closures happened at $40–50/lb uranium. The reactors weren’t losing money on fuel — they were losing money on power prices. Once power prices recovered and states introduced Zero Emission Credit subsidies (New York, Illinois, New Jersey), the remaining fleet stabilized. If uranium spikes cause a similar economic crisis, you’d expect similar political intervention — nuclear is now a national security priority in a way it simply wasn’t in 2015.

The more likely response isn’t shutdown. It’s a combination of stretching fuel cycles from 18 months to 24 months (reducing uranium consumption 10–15%), increasing enrichment levels to use less physical U3O8 (substituting SWU for yellowcake — ironic, given the enrichment bottleneck), filing rate cases to pass costs to ratepayers (with 12–18 months of regulatory lag), and lobbying Congress for emergency intervention. All of which buy time. None of which fix the structural deficit.

How Realistic Are $200 and $300?

$200/lb is plausible as a sustained price for 1–3 years. The supply deficit is real and widening. Secondary supplies are depleting. Kazatomprom is cutting production. The 2028 Russian ban creates a step-function increase in uncovered demand. The DOE is competing against utilities for the same feedstock. At $200/lb, the math works — marginal mines start restarting, but it takes 12–18 months to bring ISR operations online and 3–5 years for conventional mines, so the supply response doesn’t catch the price for at least a year.

$300/lb is plausible as a spike, not a sustained price. At $300, three things happen simultaneously: every mothballed mine on earth starts producing (adding 20–30 Mlbs within 18 months), utilities aggressively stretch fuel cycles and substitute enrichment for physical uranium, and governments intervene (the DOE has authority to release strategic reserves, and Congress would almost certainly act on grid reliability grounds). The 2007 uranium cycle hit $140/lb and collapsed. A spike to $300 is possible in a panic — say, a Kazatomprom force majeure on top of the Russian ban — but it’s unlikely to hold for more than a quarter or two before supply response and demand destruction kick in.

What Our Model Overstates (and What It Doesn’t)

The earnings impact tables above model a scenario where every utility buys 100% of its uranium at the new spot price simultaneously. That’s not how fuel procurement works. Utility fuel teams run staggered contract portfolios — some contracts rolling off in 2027, some in 2029, some in 2032. The damage is real, but it phases in over 3–5 years as old $40–50/lb contracts get replaced by $80–150/lb term contracts, not all at once.

What the tables do accurately capture is the direction and magnitude of the problem. Constellation will not see a $1.8 billion fuel cost increase in year one — it might see $400–600 million as 20–30% of contracts reprice, growing each subsequent year. But over a full contract cycle, the cumulative damage converges toward those table numbers. And the spot market exposure — the 11.5 million pounds of unfilled requirements in 2028 — hits at whatever the market charges, no stagger, no buffer.

The thesis isn’t “utilities go bankrupt next quarter.” The thesis is: utilities priced for a nuclear renaissance are actually entering a multi-year cost squeeze that the market hasn’t modeled, and the stocks most extended above their 200WMAs have the farthest to fall when forward guidance adjusts.

The Miners: Every Single One Is Extended

Not one of these is within shouting distance of the 200WMA. The least extended is NXE at +91.6% — still nearly double its long-term average.

Energy Fuels (UUUU, $18.67) is the only US-based company that mines uranium, produces vanadium, and is building rare earth element processing capacity ¹⁶. The White Mesa Mill in Utah is the only conventional uranium mill operating in the US. UUUU also has DOE contracts for uranium recovery and is positioning as a domestic supply chain play during the Russia decoupling. Revenue is $65.9M with negative operating margins, but it sits on $862M in cash against $676M in debt, and the book value is $2.82 per share (P/B of 6.6x — expensive).

Centrus Energy (LEU, $209.64) is arguably the most strategically critical company on this list. It operates the only NRC-licensed HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium) production facility in the US, in Piketon, Ohio ¹⁵. HALEU is the fuel required for next-generation reactor designs — every SMR developer (NuScale, Oklo, X-energy, TerraPower) needs it. There is currently zero commercial HALEU supply outside of Russia. LEU is it. The stock reflects this monopoly position at 130% above the line and 54x earnings. The $1.96B in cash against $1.2B in debt gives it a fortress balance sheet for scaling production.

Cameco (CCJ, $107.92) is the blue chip. Largest Western uranium miner, Tier 1 assets in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin, 40% stake in the Westinghouse nuclear services business ¹⁷. Revenue hit $3.5B in 2025. It’s the safest way to play uranium — and at 122% above the line with a P/E of 109, it’s the most expensive. CCJ trades at 9.4x book value. The market is paying nearly ten times the value of Cameco’s physical assets for the privilege of uranium exposure. That’s a bet on uranium prices going much higher — and they might, but the framework doesn’t chase bets.

The One Below the Line: NuScale Power (SMR)

Here’s the plot twist. In the entire nuclear/uranium universe, there is exactly one stock below its 200-week moving average: NuScale Power (SMR, $11.80), sitting -20.3% below the line.

NuScale is the only company with an NRC-approved small modular reactor design. Its VOYGR power plant design can be deployed in modules of 77 MW each — factory-built, shipped to site, lower capital cost than traditional gigawatt-scale plants. The technology is real. The NRC certification is real.

The problem: NuScale canceled its flagship Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP) with Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) in late 2023 after costs escalated from $5.3B to $9.3B ¹⁸. The stock cratered from $14 to $2. It’s recovered since, but the scar tissue is deep. Revenue is $31.5M. Operating margins are -33%. This is a pre-commercial company burning through its $1.25B cash pile (zero debt, which is notable).

The framework’s take on SMR: Below the 200WMA with zero debt and $1.25B in cash, NuScale passes the “not going bankrupt” test. But it fails the earnings quality layer — there are no real earnings. This is a technology bet, not a value investment. The mungbeans framework would call this a speculative signal — the line is telling you the market has given up on the business, and the question is whether the market is wrong. Given the structural uranium/nuclear tailwind, the NRC-approved design, and the $1.25B cash buffer, there’s a case that the market is wrong. But the framework can’t confirm it with fundamentals.

The Utility Danger Zone: Ranked by Exposure

Here’s every major US nuclear utility, ranked by how much of their net income gets destroyed at $200/lb uranium — the metric that actually matters.

CEG and VST are the danger stocks. Constellation’s 20 GW nuclear fleet — the same fleet the market is celebrating — becomes a $2.9 billion annual cost headwind at $300/lb. That’s more than the company earns. VST is overextended at +82% above the line with the smallest earnings buffer of any name on this list. These are the stocks where the “nuclear renaissance” narrative collides with the “uranium supercycle” math — and the math wins.

The utilities clustered at +32–35% above the line (PPL, DUK, NEE, SO) are the “quiet risk” group. They’re diversified enough that nuclear fuel costs don’t destroy earnings — but 19–31% net income hits on stocks already priced 32–35% above their long-term averages create the kind of guidance miss that pushes extended stocks back toward the line. As regulated utilities, they can eventually pass costs to ratepayers, but “eventually” means 12–18 months of regulatory lag, and rate cases aren’t guaranteed — regulators facing inflation-weary consumers have every reason to push back.

PG&E (PCG, $18.14) is the interesting exception. At only +12% above the 200WMA and 10.1x forward P/E, it’s already priced for skepticism. PCG operates Diablo Canyon — California’s last nuclear plant, saved from closure by a $1.4B state loan in 2025 ¹⁹. Diablo Canyon produces 8.6% of California’s electricity. The catch: $61.3B in debt from the 2019 wildfire bankruptcy. But the uranium math actually favors PCG — at only 2.3 GW of nuclear capacity against $2.6B in net income, a $200/lb uranium scenario costs PCG 7.8% of earnings. Compare that to Constellation at 77.3% or Vistra at 29.0%. PCG is the nuclear utility with the least uranium exposure relative to its earnings, the lowest forward P/E, and the closest position to the 200WMA.

If the uranium squeeze pushes nuclear utilities down, PCG is the one most likely to hit the 200WMA first — and it’s the one with the least fundamental damage from the squeeze. The utility everybody avoids because of wildfire debt is actually the safest nuclear utility in a uranium cost spiral.

What the Framework Says About Uranium

Uranium is in a structural supply deficit. Demand is accelerating from Japan restarts, China builds, AI data centers, and energy security policy. Russia sanctions are choking enrichment supply. Kazatomprom is cutting production. US utilities are drawing down stockpiles. Every fundamental points to higher uranium prices.

And the market knows all of this. That’s why CCJ is at 122% above the line, UUUU at 136%, and LEU at 130%. The thesis is priced. The question the framework asks is: what happens when everyone knows something? The answer, historically, is mean reversion. Not because the thesis was wrong, but because the enthusiasm overshoots.

The 200-week moving average doesn’t care about your thesis. It cares about whether you’re paying a price that gives you a margin of safety. Right now, in uranium, you’re not. You’re paying for perfection in a market that has a long history of disappointing the consensus at exactly the moment everyone agrees.

But here’s what the framework does see: the uranium bull case has a victim class. The miners win. The enrichers win. The utilities — the ones actually buying uranium to keep their reactors running — get squeezed. We stress-tested the math above: the damage doesn’t hit all at once (staggered contracts spread it over 3–5 years), $300/lb is more likely a spike than a sustained price, and utilities have tools to mitigate (fuel cycle stretching, rate cases, lobbying). But the direction is unambiguous. At $200/lb sustained — a plausible scenario — Constellation loses 77% of net income to fuel cost increases as contracts roll. At a $300 spike, it goes net-negative. Vistra loses 29–46%. PPL and Duke lose 19–31%. And the enrichment bottleneck is arguably worse than the uranium price: even with yellowcake in hand, Western enrichment capacity can’t process enough fuel once Russia is cut off in 2028. The utilities most extended above their 200WMAs are the ones with the farthest to fall when forward guidance adjusts.

The framework’s uranium playbook:

1. Don’t chase the miners. CCJ, UUUU, UEC, LEU — all 90%+ above the line. If you already own them, congratulations. If you don’t, the framework says the entry point is behind you (or ahead of you, after a correction).

2. Watch NuScale (SMR) carefully. The only nuclear name below the line. Pre-revenue and speculative, but zero debt and $1.25B cash. If it signs a new project to replace CFPP, the re-rating could be dramatic.

3. Nuclear utilities above the line are the victim class. CEG (+64%) loses 77% of net income at $200/lb uranium as contracts roll over 3–5 years, and goes net-negative during a $300 spike. VST (+82%) loses 29–46%. The damage phases in gradually — but the enrichment bottleneck compounds it. Even utilities with yellowcake in hand can’t get it enriched once Russia is cut off: Urenco and Orano are booked solid, Centrus is focused on HALEU. The market is celebrating reactor fleets without pricing either the fuel bill or the enrichment queue. The “nuclear renaissance” narrative lifts these stocks while the supply chain underneath them fractures.

4. PCG is the contrarian utility play. At +12% above and 10.1x forward P/E, PG&E is the closest nuclear utility to the line, the cheapest on forward earnings, and the least exposed to uranium cost spikes (only 2,256 MW vs. Constellation’s 20,000 MW). If the utility sector sells off on fuel cost fears, PCG reaches the 200WMA first with the least fundamental damage.

5. Physical uranium (Sprott, SRUUF) at +21% above the line is the most direct commodity exposure with the least premium to the 200WMA among any pure uranium vehicle. But it pays no yield and is a pure price bet.

6. The patient play: When this cycle corrects — and it will, whether in 6 months or 18 — the framework will find uranium miners below their 200WMAs for the first time since 2020. That’s when you buy the decade-long thesis at a price that gives you an edge. The cycle rewards patience, not conviction.

This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. The author does not hold positions in any securities discussed. Past performance does not guarantee future results. Always do your own research before making investment decisions.

Framework methodology: mungbeans.io 200-week moving average screening system

References

All stock prices, 200WMA calculations, financial metrics (P/E, FCF, net income, market cap), and 200-week moving averages sourced from Yahoo Finance as of March 14, 2026. Fuel cost model uses standard industry assumptions for reactor fuel requirements per GW of capacity (WNA/NEI reference data).